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GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY AS RELATED TO APPEAL
PROCEDURES UNACCOMPLISHED SINCE THE
WUINDERLICH LEGISLATION
C. S. McCLELLAND*

"Decisions must be made on their merits as objectively and realistically as conscieatious and intelligent men can make them. Fairness, impartiality, and frecdom from
irrelevant considerations are now as important for the legislator and the administrator
as for the judge, perhaps even more important."' (Emphasis added.)

IT would seem reasonable to assume that, as with respect to the armed
services, the Federal Government has developed and maintains its legal
services to the extent that they are reasonably adequate at all times to
protect the public interest. With an average of at least one and one-sixth
billion dollars of public funds committed to Government contractors every
month during the period January 1, 1953, to June 30, 1955,2 the importance of adequate legal protection of the public interest is apparent. The
litigation arising from a substantial number of the contracts involves
many millions in public funds and a great variety of questions of fact
and law. The decisions rendered in that litigation affect many additional
millions paid from the same source. If those decisions appear erroneous
and reviewable, it would follow that the legal services of the Government
should provide advocacy of its position sufficiently aggressive and competent to pursue any reviewable decision against the Government through
the highest appellate court, if necessary. One type of case decided for a
number of years by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, or a
predecessor board, on an entirely irrelevant ground has precluded Government recovery of very substantial sums of money. Yet no one, duly appointed as an advocate of the Government, sought a review of those
decisions in the public interest.
I.

THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT

It would also seem reasonable to assume that if Congress, by duly enacted legislation, directed that certain review of administrative decisions
* Member of the District of Columbia and United States Supreme Court Bars. For
the most part, written while an attorney in private practice. Statcd views and conclusions,

not otherwise identified, are intended to represent none other than the author's own.
This article was submitted by the author in response to the Fordham Law Review's
standing invitation for contrary observations.

I. S. Rep. (Committee Print) of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
Ethical Standards in Government, 82d Cong., 1st Scss. 16 (1951).
2. Hearing [No. 42] Before House Committee on Armed Services, on H.R. 7995 and
H.R. S499, to amend the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 34th Cong., 1st Sess.
5029 (Foreword) (1956).
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be provided, compliance with that direction would follow as a matter of
course. Such is not the case, however. On May 11, 1954, approval was
given to an act' permitting review of decisions of the heads of departments, or their representatives or boards, involving questions arising
under Government contracts. It is stated in the legislative history4 of the
act that the purpose of the legislation is to overcome the effect of the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Wunderlich, under which the
decisions of Government officers rendered pursuant to the standard "Disputes" clause in Government contracts are held to be final absent fraud on
the part of such officers. That history further shows that the legislation
was not intended to add to, narrow, restrict, or change in any way the
present jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office either in the course
of a settlement or upon audit. It was the intention of Congress that the
General Accounting Office, as was its practice, in reviewing a contract and
change orders for the purpose of payment, shall apply the standards of
review that are granted to the courts under the act. As expressly stated
in the history, the elimination of specific mention of the General Accounting Office in the original bill is not to be construed as limiting its
review to the fraudulent intent standard prescribed by the Wunderlich
decision.6

II. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE JURISDICTION

AND
FOR ITS CONTINUANCE UNDER THE ACT

ACCORD

The jurisdiction exercised by the General Accounting Office prior to
the Wunderlich case is clearly shown in the earlier legislative history of
the act. The Assistant Comptroller General testified that in the past,
administrative decisions on questions of fact were not disturbed by the
General Accounting Office or the courts unless the action of the administrative officer was fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, grossly erroneous, or
without foundation in fact. When any of those elements was present, the
courts or the General Accounting Office, whichever happened to have
jurisdiction of the questions at the time, took action to correct the fault
of the settlement in the administrative department.7 By the proposed
legislation, "the contractors would have, as is normal in other cases, the
restored avenue of access to the General Accounting Office with their
claims if they felt aggrieved or unjustly treated by the administrative
official or body within the contracting department."18 And the contractors
3. 41 U.S.C.A. 321 (Supp. 1955).
4. U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News 2191-97 (1954).
5. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
6. U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News 2197 (1954).
7. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, on Finality
Clauses in Government Contracts, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952).
8. Id. at 11.

GOVERNMENT ADVOCACY

1956-57]

would have restored to them the avenue of the courts, which is normal in
such cases, and which the General Accounting Office believed should be
restored. Also, at those hearings, representatives of the Associated Gen-

eral Contractors of America testified that their organization advocated that
more administrative review be available, not only within a particular de-

partment, or bureau, but by an independent agency as well; their organization welcomed further administrative review, believing it to be "good government, and good practice and good procedure."

III.

EXECUTIVE INPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT

Contrary to the views expressed by representatives of industry, it is
shown in the later legislative history that while the Defense Department
noted the desire of the General Accounting Office to have the same
authority it had prior to the Wunderlich decision, that Department actually desired to exclude the General Accounting Office by limiting the
review to "courts of competent jurisdiction.""' While it was not successful in excluding the General Accounting Office in the legislation
enacted, the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration nevertheless have continued to use a "Disputes" clause, adopted
after the Wunderlich decision, which does not allow a contractor, who is
not satisfied with the administrative disposition of a factual dispute between him and the Government, to seek a review of the matter by the
General Accounting Office but requires him to incur the expense of
having the matter determined by a court of competent jurisdiction."'
9. Id. at 31.
10. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. I of the House Committee on the Judidaryi on
Review of Finality Clauses in Government Contracts, 93d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., sr. 12, at
54-55 (1954).
11. The Defense Department indicated in the earlier hearings, supra note 7, at 91, that
it intended to use such restrictive language in an amendment which was done in a restatement of the clause as follows:
"DISPUTES
Except as otherwise provided in th:s contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact
arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the
Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or othcrwise furnish
a copy thereof to the Contractor. Within 30 days from the date of receipt of cuch copy,
the Contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing to the Contracting Ofikcer
a written appeal addressed to the Head of the Agency, and the decision of the Head of the
Agency or his duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall,
unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent or capricious
or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by
substantial evidence, be final and conclusive; Provided, That, if no such appeal is taken, the
decision of the Contracting Officer -hall be final and conclusive. In connection with any
appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be
heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute
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In other words, the two largest procurement agencies of the Government
seem to have ignored the express intent of the act by persisting, for
approximately three years since the act, in the use of an amendment to the
"Disputes" clause which does precisely what Congress has said should
not be done-narrow, restrict and change the jurisdiction of the General
Accounting Office by confining any further consideration of questions of
fact to a court of competent jurisdiction.12 It thus appears that unless
their authority is challenged, the agencies involved will not conform to
the act.
IV.

FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO PROVIDE GOVERNMENT
APPEAL PROCEDURES

Another important aspect of the hearing on the "Disputes" clause was
the testimony relating to the need for providing an effective means
for the Government to appeal from administrative decisions and rulings
against it. Industry appeared to agree with Government representatives
that appeal rights should be fully realized by both contracting parties. 13
The Comptroller General pointed out that the rule of the Wunderlich
decision placed contracting officials "in a position to make as arbitrary
and reckless use of their power against the interests of the Government
as against the interests of the contractor." 4 The Assistant Comptroller
General explained that the experience of the General Accounting Office
had been that such decisions were not infrequent"; and that certainly the
rights of contractors and the Government to review or appeal should be
coextensive.' 6 Even the representative of the Department of Justice, who
approved the Wunderlich decision, testified that it seemed quite possible
that article 15 of Government contract form 23 was a one-way street
open to the contractors but not to the Government and that the contractor is given the right to appeal to the head of the department concerned, whereas the article is completely silent as to the Government's
right of appeal. In the same vein is the testimony of the representative
of the Associated General Contractors of America that notwithstanding
the availability of further administrative review, the procedure should
permit judicial review, whether it be the Government or the contractor,
and that his organization wanted to take the position of being absolutely
hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and
in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision." (Emphasis added.)

12. The Defense Department has admitted that "the legislation goes farther than the
revision we have made to our contracts." Hearings, supra note 10, at 124.
13. Hearings, supra note 7, at 31, 83-84.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id. at 15-16.
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fair in urging legislation that would protect the rights of both parties.8
Yet it has not been found that Congress has, or that the administrative
agencies have, taken any action to give the Government effective procedures to appeal whenever an adverse administrative ruling or decision
appears in error.
V.

IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY

Since any Government appeal procedures that might be established
would involve added or new responsibility for certain Government attorneys, some consideration of the functions and responsibilities of the
Government attorney appears in order. The mechanism of such appeal
procedures would be operated most effectively by Government attorneys
with a dear conception of their duties and responsibilities.' It would
appear important to consider the extent to which such a conception now
exists. An appropriate inquiry might involve the uniformity of thinking
among Government attorneys relating to the extent of the aggressiveness
which they are expected to exercise as advocates of the Government. It
seems certain that there would be a great variety of answers if all Government attorneys suddenly were requested to write, without delay, their
exact understanding of this matter.
At the outset, it would seem indispensable that the advocacy of the
Government's position must proceed unconfused and uninfluenced by any
situation such as described in certain testimony in a Senate report:
"Judge Hand. May I say something that perhaps I should not say. I hope this will
not offend you. Take the immigration cases. I have seen in a good many records, quite
often, that Congressman Jones or Senator McGill is 'interested' in this case. Now,
frankly, when I see that, I do not like it. I hope it does not influence me in the result,
but truly it makes me pretty mad.
"Senator Douglas. We undoubtedly sin, but there are other sinners besides ourzeves.' -

Those who serve in any agency where they are expected to resolve a matter strictly along judicial lines, and therefore without partiality, obviously
cannot defend the Government's position with the aggressiveness that
may be required to match or overcome that of the attorney for the private
party. In other words, since man is unable to serve two masters at the
same time, it is manifest that no Government attorney can treat a matter
judiciously for both parties and at the same time treat it with the aggresIS. Id. at 31-32.

19. "In the last analysis, the adequacy of legal servic ... depends upon the ability
of individual Government attorneys." Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Legal
Services and Procedures, at 12 (1955).
20. Hearings Before a Subcommittee to Study Senate Concurrent Recolution 21 of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, on a Commission on Ethics in Government, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 228 (1951).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

siveness required by the Government, as one of the parties. The Government must have the same protection as that enjoyed by the other party
whose private attorney is not circumscribed by attempting to serve in a
dual capacity.
Various public remarks about Government personnel, in general, have
been made from time to time which may give the impression that there
is no reasonable uniformity of thought and action in Government advocacy and that the Government and the taxpayer suffer from such a
situation. In the hearings on the establishment of a Commission of Ethics
in Government, it was stated that there is too much truth in the belief
that it is dangerous for public servants to put their necks out to defend
the public interest and that it is generally thought that promotion and
confirmation may be more readily secured by those who do not do so. 2
It was noted at those hearings that the country needs public servants who
are not only ethical, honorable, and competent, but also those who have
backbone., Somewhat along the same line was a further comment that:
"... one of the common criticisms of Government service, and the military service,
too, is that by the system of rating schedules, the conformist and the man who plays
safe, the man who curries favor with his superior, tends to be rewarded on the fitness
reports. The innovator tends to get penalized. After a time, men decide that the way
toward promotion is acquiescence, currying favor with the superiors, and a species of
timidity." 2

In that connection it is of interest to note the remarks of a former assistant to a Secretary of Agriculture that in most instances, it is obligatory
that the representations made by powerful individuals and groups be
referred by higher Government officials to subordinate levels and that,
therefore, the manner of the reference is crucially important so that the
subordinate feels free to base his action entirely on the merits of the
matter2 3 and that:
"Every time that a subordinate official is caused to arrive at a different judgment
because of influence from on high, without an explanation that shows intrinsic considerations, he is inclined to think that is a directive to practice favoritism.
"That goes on so often-poor references and misunderstood references made so often
that the people down the line think that they are being counseled in the direction of
favoritism, and then they are not as courageous and not as firm in their attitudes as
24
they themselves would like to be.'

It is to be noted that the Hoover Commission found that, "too often, the
attorney in the Government is considered and treated as an employee
with special talent, to be called upon to submit opinions sustaining a posi21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 294.
at 142.
at 169.
at 175.
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tion previously determined by a nonlawyer superior. Hence the term
'pushbutton' lawyer."2 5 A member of Congress previously has expressed
a similar view:
"It is the government lawyer to whom the Administration turns for legal justification of whatever policy may be desired. It is the government lawyer who is called
upon to find a way around the law-if necessary-to tailor an interpretation which will
fit a preconceived notion by the executive branch of what the law should he, not
necessarily what Congress intended it should be.' 26

On the other hand, it has been said that:
"The Government has grown so big that the people at the head of agencies... are
devoting their entire time to politics and policy. The decisions that are actually made
are made at the lower echelons. They are made on memoranda prepared by people
way down the line most of the time."- 7

How can the Service attorney, who represents the Government in a
case before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, secure General Accounting Office review of an adverse decision by the Appeals
Board on a disputed question of fact? It would seem that once the advocate for the Government, the Service attorney, has exhausted his rights
before a "Disputes" board, he must abandon his client, the Government,
and take up the next case before his employer, who, through the Board,
has just ruled against him. That attorney soon might be persona non
grata if he sought a review by an agency which his employer pointedly is
trying to exclude by specific language in the pertinent contract provision.
The pertinent administrative regulations of the Department of Defense
contain no outline of procedures to show that the Department is even
cognizant of the importance of making definite provisions for Government appeal procedures, even as to "a court of competent jurisdiction,"
and of making certain that all personnel involved are fully aware of those
procedures and of the obligation to insist on their use whenever the
Government appears entitled to "another day in court." Moreover, since
the language of the "Disputes" clause shows that the decision of the Appeals
Board is the decision of the head of the Department, it hardly seems
likely that any part of the Government but Congress can take the action
necessary to protect the public interest in this respect. This could be
25. Legal Services and Procedure, a Report to the Congres by the Hoover Commt.ion
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 17 (1955). The Hoover
Task Force found that morale among attorneys in the executive branch is not as high as it
should be and that the primary difficulty is that they do not have the feeling of professional
service which characterizes the performance of legal work in other areas; that an attorney
in a Government legal position is concerned about the possibility of political cons-derations,
affecting his tenure and promotions. Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Legag
Services and Procedures, Hoover Task Force Report 15, 93 (1955).
26. Halleck, The Role of the Lawyer in Government, 37 A.BAJ. sS9, 891 (1951).
27. Hearings, supra note 20, at 445.
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accomplished by making it mandatory that each of the executive departments establish effective Government appeal procedures whereby the
Government is completely assured of an adequate mechanism for review of
an appealable administrative decision in any contract case, and whereby
the employee representing the Government is fully protected. Otherwise,
it appears very probable that pride of authorship in the decisions rendered
will preclude any real voluntary effort within the various departments to
provide the necessary effective procedures.
The Hoover Commission has stated that in the construction and the
application of statutes, attorneys in Government should be a restraining
influence in keeping administrative action within the letter and spirit of
the law. To perform that responsibility properly, the Commission reported that Government attorneys must have that degree of independence
from administrative control which will enable them to serve as lawyers
in Government and not merely as employees of Government.2 8 But Congressman Halleck warns that ever-increasing authority over the life of
America has passed from the hands of Congress into the hands of the
Government lawyer and asserts that:
"We are rapidly becoming a nation which operates under a system of 'procedural
regulations' based on interpretations of the laws passed by the Congress. It is the
Government lawyer who is writing these hundreds upon hundreds of rules and regulations under which the statutes are implemented." 29
80
In the material that has been written on the Government attorney,
including the work of the Hoover Commission and the regulations of the
executive agencies, there has been found no discussion of the extent to
which attorneys have been assigned the job of appealing from decisions
and rulings adverse to the Government. It has been said that the Government as a contractor should be regarded as any other contracting party.
Therefore, if the best interests of the Government are to be fully protected, it would seem especially important that an attorney representing
the Government should be made fully aware that he is expected to be at
least as aggressive as he would be if he were the attorney for the other
party.
VI. INPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE'S REAL STATUS

A clear understanding of the extent to which an independent office,
such as the General Accounting Office, could implement the establishment
of effective procedures to protect the Government's interests against ad28. Hoover Commission, Report to Congress, op. tit. supra note 25, at 17.
29. Halleck, op. cit. supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., Baldwin and Hall, Using Government Lawyers to Animate Bureaucracy,
63 Yale L.J. 197 (1953).
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verse decisions of "Disputes" boards should leave no doubt as to the
importance of utilizing its full authority to that end. The General Accounting Office has the authority to take issue with such boards whenever
their decisions, adverse to the Government, involve questions of law or
mixed questions of law and fact, or questions of fact in which the decision
is "fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence." 31 If
the matter involves questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact,
the reasonableness of the board's decision does not affect the General
Accounting Office's authority to question the merits of the decision.
a. PossibilitiesInherent in the General Accounting Offce's
Audit Functions
The audit function of the General Accounting Office is always entitled
to operate if the "Disputes" board's decision be erroneous in law, or
"fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence."'
The fact that in effect the General Accounting Office would be auditing
the action of the head of the Department, who had acted through his
appeal board, would appear to be a mere incident in the functioning of
audit operations. Any question that a contracting officer may raise
against a contractor and thereby initiate a potential case for a "Disputes"
board, is one that a General Accounting Office auditor may raise. The exact
question a contracting officer may have raised may be one he knows was
raised or was threatened to be raised by an auditor under the same or similar
contract. The mere fact that the question has been resolved in favor of the
contractor at the highest level, rather than at the contracting officer echelon
in the executive agency, should be no bar to an audit exception by the legislative office authorized to perform the audit, if the decision be reviewable.
Such audit action conceivably could have a most salutary restraining
effect upon the decisions rendered by "Disputes" boards, especially where
the question basically is a question of law and therefore reviewable without regard to the standards stated in the "Disputes" clause.
b. Weaknesses of Adverse Criticism of GAO
There has been too much publicity given to views which profess to
acknowledge the desirability of an independent office, such as the General
31.

41 U.S.C.A. § 321 (Supp. 1955).

32. Ibid. In view of the legislative history heretofore considercd, fbowing the clear
intention of Congress to retain GAO's jurisdiction as it v.-as prior to the Wunderlich care,
administrative retention of language "by a court of competent jurLdiction" could be ignored

by the General Accounting Office in its audit action even though such language prima fade
excludes it.
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Accounting Office, but which fail to show how it is to justify itself if it
cannot be allowed to operate in such a manner as to be fully effective.
One view, which had no objection to the principle of surveillance, declared
that surveillance would be obtained "from inside the agencies" but failed
to show how it could be accomplished. Another has said that the complaint has been that the General Accounting Office "goes into the merits
of the thing ' but he did not indicate how it could determine the legality
of anything without considering its merits. Also, administrative findings
of fact are not considered binding when the matter is a mixed question of
law and fact.
Still another writer accepts the principle of an independent office but
he does not explain how its function, its responsibility only to Congress,
and the desire of successive Comptroller Generals to retain the independent status, have led to a ". . bureaucratic ideology which is often
harmful not only to Government contractors but to the best interests of
the Government".5 In the absence of any explanation for such a statement, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the writer is one of those
who pay mere lip service to the principle of independence involved but
who actually objects to such use of that independence as will make the
office effective.
In August 1954, a report3 6 of the Committee on Comptroller GeneralGeneral Accounting Office, of the Administrative Law Section of the
American Bar Association seemed to rely on but four cases37 in a period
of over thirty years to support its conclusion, as to the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office, "that there is much to criticize
so that many loose practices may be lightened to the end that the public
interest will be better served." Even if all four of those decisions could conclusively be said to show the 'Comptroller General in error, which the Committee has failed to do, four errors in a period of thirty years is an unusually
good fielding average when compared with the various courts of the
country. However, aside from that fact, it is obvious from the impression
it attempted to create, that the Committee does not subscribe to the prin33. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on
bills To Provide for the Settlement of Claims Arising from Terminated War Contracts, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 16, at 226, 271 (1944).
34. Palace Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 545, 110 F. Supp, 476, cert. denied, 346
U.S. 815 (1953); Allied Contractors v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 400, 124 F. Supp. 366

(1954).
35. Cable, The General Accounting Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contracting Officers, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 780, 790 (1952).
36. 6 Ad. L. Bull. 195-203 (1954).
37. Belcher v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 137 (1941) ; McCabe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl.
291 (1936) ; Moreno v. United States, 70 Ct. Cl. 758, 762, 764 (1930) ; 31 Comp. Gen. 370
(1952).
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ciple of independence which the General Accounting Office is obligated
by law to observe and that it does not fully understand the position that
the General Accounting Office must take so long as Congress considers it
in the Government's interests to maintain such an independent office. Not
too many years ago, Congress had an ample opportunity to question the
General Accounting Office and its conception of certain of its duties and
obligations, but instead appeared to approve that conception 3 Mfore recently members of Congress, industry and the legal profession have stated
that the General Accounting Office serves "a very good purpose"; that
it does "excellent work";39 and that the General Accounting Act represents one of the great advances in the administration of the GovernmentA0
c. The GeneralAccounting Office as an Appeals Board
Any suggestion of the General Accounting Office as an appeals board
is certain to be met with protests that it would become another Court of
Claims. Yet the foundation of such a protest appears no more certain in
the establishment of an appeals board in an independent office of the
legislative branch of the Government than it does in connection with the
similar board in the Defense Department or in any of the other agencies
of the executive branch. 4 '
The importance of examining the role of the Government attorney is
clearly shown by visualizing the relative position of the contracting
parties after the attorney for the Government succeeds in appealing to
the Comptroller General from an adverse ruling by the Appeal Board.
If the Government is to have the full benefit of an appeal to the Comptroller General as the head of a legislative agency, uncircumscribed in its
advocacy of the Government's position by any shortcomings in such advocacy by the legal representatives in the executive agencies, it would
seem reasonable to expect that the case on appeal would be handled by
two attorneys, rather than one. The duty of one of those attorneys would
be to write the decision in the case. Since the role of the Comptroller
General in deciding the case on appeal would be quasi-judicial in nature,
the attorney writing the decision necessarily could not act either with any
38. Hearings, supra note 32, at 226.
39. Hearings, supra note 7, at 84.
40. Hearings, supra note 10, at 1S; See also Hearings Before Subcommittee of Houe
Committee on Appropriations, on Independent Offices Appropriation for 1957, 84th Cong,
2d Sess., at 1399 (1956).

41. Consideration of the matter by an adjustment board of an independent legirlative
office, such as the General Accounting Office, would seem appropriate procedure if either
party has the right to appeal from the decision of the Board in the executive branch. The
use of a Board by the General Accounting Office would appear equally as important and
justifiable as its use in the Defense Department and in other agencie3 of the executive
branch. Cf. first full statement, Hearings, supra note 32 at 225.
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of the competitive aggressiveness of the contractor's attorney or with any
of the general aggressiveness expected of the office which is the agent of
Congress and the Watch dog of the Treasury. At the same time, if the
interests of the Government are to be protected, that aggressiveness,
which the decision attorney could not exercise, must be otherwise accomplished in the Comptroller General's office. To accomplish that would be
the duty of the other General Accounting Office attorney assigned to the
case. To be certain that such an attorney would be able to exercise the
appropriate aggressiveness in his advocacy of the Government's position,
it would appear necessary that he and the group of attorneys who would
be permanently assigned to that type of advocacy, occupy the same rank
and status under the Comptroller General as that which would be occupied by the decision group. Such an arrangement would, of course, necessitate the establishment of something in the nature of an adjustment or
appeals board which would render the decisions previously rendered in
the name of the Comptroller General. While the board would be under
the general jurisdiction of the Comptroller General, it would have complete independence in the rendering of decisions. The advocacy group
would have the same independence of action, especially in deciding
whether an adverse decision by the General Accounting Office adjustment
board should be referred to the Attorney General for suit in the courts.
The Comptroller General would have a supervisory function to see that
both the board and the advocacy group operated smoothly. Of equal
importance to that function would be that official's responsibility to make
to the appropriate committee of Congress periodic reports of all cases
which did not receive appropriate aggressive advocacy after they left his
office. One duty of the advocacy group would be to see that it was kept
fully informed of the progress of the case after it reached the Justice
Department, especially with respect to offers of compromise, and to
make certain that the 'Comptroller General was well briefed for his
periodic reports on the progress of cases closed and pending in the Department of Justice. Such procedure would be an essential part and
"follow through" of the aggressiveness incumbent upon the advocacy
group if Government appeal procedures are to be fully effective. Otherwise, the high degree of aggressiveness attained in the advocacy of
the Government's position after the case came from the executive to the
legislative branch might be lost when the case reappeared in the executive
branch whose opinion is being challenged."
42. This will be challenged as an attempt to substitute the judgment of the Comptroller
General for that of the Attorney General as to whether a case should be pursued. No such
attempt is intended. Instead, the idea is to provide means of assuring an evaluation, by an
independent legislative agency, of the considerations which influenced the judgment exercised
in a given case. If that judgment was exercised on sound, valid grounds, it will withstand
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Other obligations of the advocacy group would be to see that all of the
facts, legal precedents, legislative history, etc., were presented to and
considered by the adjustment board, to seek reconsideration by the board
if its ruling sustained the Appeals Board, and to see that the complete
set-off resources of the Government were fully realized and coordinated
in the case.
VII.

IMTPORTANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS SUCH

Tim

ARMED

SERVIcES BoARi

As THOSE BY

OF CONTRACT APPEALS

It has been said that the number of claims arising out of contracts
with the Federal Government is enormous; that the technicalities require
fact findings of great length and complexity; and that the litigation involves
nearly every conceivable question of administrative and contract
law.4 3
Approximately three years ago, it was indicated that many lawyers
have no knowledge about boards of contract appeals:4 No doubt that is
still true today among lawyers as well as among most laymen. Yet during
the ten years of its existence prior to May 1953, it has been reported that
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and its predecessors have received 3,431 appeals and have rendered 2,688 written decisions.a This report states that those appeals involved millions of dollars
and just about every conceivable dispute that can arise during the performance of military contracts which have totaled billions of dollars.
With the further fact in mind that the decisions rendered affected many
more millions of dollars involved in questions which never reached the
Board because contracting officers, influenced by those decisions, allowed
many items which would have been questioned, it can be understood how
important it is that the decisions be fully supportable on the merits and
without regard for irrelevant considerations.'
An attempt has been made by the Defense Department to show that
because over a nine-year period there was an average of only two cases
per year in which the Contract Appeals Board was actually reversed, the
fairness and effectiveness of the administrative handling of disputes has
any valid evaluation. If it was not so exercised, the evaluation will and -should dfl6ose it.
If the General Accounting Office does not perform its evaluation function, then it is cut
short before it has the opportunity for necessary fulfillment. Action in the Goverment's

interest initiated in such a legislative office should not have to anticipate any frustration in a
later executive step in that action.
43. Comment, Appeals from Administrative Decisions in Government Contract Dispute,
31 Texas L. Rev. 552 (1953).

44. Cuneo, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, Tyrant or Impartial Tribunal?, 39
A.BAJ. 373 (1953).
45. Id. at 375.
46.

S. Rep. supra note 1.
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been demonstrated. But those statistics overlook the fact that during
that period, as at present, the Government's position really had no effective advocacy. Therefore, if an examination of certain Board decisions
discloses a number of cases decided against the Government on irrelevant
considerations, the need for a careful analysis of all those decisions,
as well as the establishment of definite appeal procedures for the Government, seems most compelling. The fact that studies have indicated that
the number of Board decisions appealed to the General Accounting Office
are few in number refers,4 8 of course, to appeals by contractors only, since
no procedures yet exist for the Government to make such an appeal. It is safe to say that the need for an appeal by the Government
could be found in many other cases besides those analyzed in this article
if the Board did not fail so frequently to show the argument presented
by the Government in support of the contracting officer's action. Without
that knowledge there is no means of accurately evaluating the merits of
many decisions. To present the argument of one side only in a dispute
seems a strange way to present a written opinion on the controversy.
Since the Wunderlich legislation, contractors have been relatively successful in appealing to the Court of Claims from administrative decisions.
There would appear to be no reason why the Government, with equally
aggressive appellate advocacy, could not be equally, if not more successful,
in securing reversals by an appropriate adjustment board or court. In the
case of Wagner-WhirlerDerrick Corp. v. United States,49 the court found as
to one item, among others, that the contracting officer's decision not only
was not supported by substantial evidence, but that it closely approached
being capricious, and so grossly erroneous as to show recklessness, if not to
imply bad faith. On the other hand, in the case of F. H. McGraw & Co. v.
United States,0 the court held that the contracting officer's finding as to
equitable adjustment was binding on the court since it was not seriously
contended that it was unsupported by substantial evidence, citing the case
of United States v. CallahanWalker Co., ' Similarly, in the case of Hadden
v. United States,6 the court held that the Contract Appeal Board's finding
as to the facts relative to the propriety of termination for default was binding on the court since there was no allegation by the contractor that the
findings were arbitrary, capricious or not supported by substantial evidence.
However, in the case of Williams v. United States,6 3 the court found that
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Hearings, supra note 10, at 54.
Supra note 44, at 373, 436.
128 Ct. C1. 382, 121 F. Supp. 664, 670 (1954).
131 Ct. CI. 501, 130 F. Supp. 394, 400 (1955).
317 U.S. 56 (1942).
131 Ct. C1. 326, 130 F. Supp. 610, 614 (1955).
130 Ct. C1. 435, 127 F. Supp. 617, 621, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955).
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the decision of the head of the department was not supported by substantial evidence and refused to be bound. The court also rejected the
administrative findings in General Casualty Co. of America v. United
States,r4 where it was held that the contracting officer's failure to make
an equitable adjustment for removal of shale was arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence, and thus not conclusive.

VTIII.

CASES ILLUSTRATING NECESSrrY OF ESTABLISHING
APPEAL PROCEDURES

a. The Metro Case and the Covenant Against Contingent Fees
An excellent illustration of the cost of not challenging certain very
vulnerable opinions of The Appeals Board is to be found in one case involving at least $173,000. In that caseP5 the Metro Engineering and Manufacturing Company agreed to pay to an agent partnership ten per cent
of the gross dollar amount of each order for the sale of services and products accepted by Metro. The agency obtained 225 Government contracts
for which Metro is reported to have paid the agency $173,500.77. The
question was whether under the agency agreement the contractor, Metro,
violated the covenant against contingent fees in each of the contracts.
This covenant read as follows:
"The contractor warrants that no person or selling agency has been employed or
retained to solicit or secure this contract upon an agreement or understanding for a
commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee, excepting bona fide employees
or bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the contractor
for the purpose of securing business. For breach or violation of this warranty the
Government shall have the right to annul this contract without liability or in its
discretion to deduct from the contract price or consideration the full amount of such
commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee."

The Board cited the cases of United States v. Buckley, Reynolds v.
Goodwin-Hill Corp..47 and A-B Stoves Division, 9 as recognizing that the
language of the exception stated in the covenant is not clear, and stated
that the decisions of the Federal courts are not in harmony as to the
meaning to be given to the exception, especially the word "maintained",
referring to the cases of Bradley v. American Radiator & StandardSanitary Corp.,5 9 and United States v. Paddock." What it failed to mention
54.
55.

130 Ct. CI. 520, 127 F. Supp. SO5, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955).
Metro Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 1495, 6 CCF 9 61,567 (1954).

56.

49 F. Supp. 993 (D.D.C. 1943).

57. 154 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1946).
58. ASBCA No. 1224 (1953).
59. 159 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1947).
60. 178 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1949), petition for rehearing denied, 180 F2d 121 (Sth Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950).
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is that only the last cited of these cases actually contains an assertion of
what the word means." As to that meaning the Board apparently agreed
with the court in the case of Beach v. Illinois Lumber Mfg. Co.,0 2 which
criticized it as rendering the exception to the covenant meaningless, and
proceeded to follow Armed Service Procurement Regulation 1-505.4
which the Board described as an endeavor to be realistic and to recognize
the true intent and purpose of the covenant by giving it a reasonable construction. The Board refers to that regulation as an excellent statement
of the principles and standards to be used as a guide in determining
whether the agency involved qualified under the covenant. The regulation
contains no language to explain the principles or standards to be used in
determining whether an agent is "maintained", as required by the covenant. However, the Board ignored that omission and limited its discussion of the facts of the agency to the various parts of the regulation and
then concludes that the agency was "maintained" and that the contracting officers were in error when they found to the contrary. It is clear that
without stating its interpretation of the word "maintained", and without
stating any reason for concluding that the agency was maintained, the
Board, not the court in the Paddock case, rendered the exception meaningless. At the same time, by ignoring one of the important words in the exception, the Board also rendered the covenant meaningless. Either the
exception must be interpreted in the light of the significance of each of its
terms or the process becomes one of interpolation rather than one of interpretation. The Board would have been in a stronger position if it had stated
any meaning at all for the word, even if the meaning had been insupportable.
By not giving any meaning after an unpersuasive rejection of the meaning
given by a court of competent jurisdiction which held in favor of the
Government, and yet stating the conclusion which it did, the Board gives
the distinct impression of being evasive and slurring over the most important issue in the case. And by allowing an agency to qualify, that was not
"maintained" as required by the exception, the Board placed the Government in no better position than it would have been if there had been no
covenant against contingent fees in any of the contracts awarded to
Metro. Since the Board did not analyze the case in the light of the proper
meaning to be attributed to the word "maintained", no space will be consumed in showing why the Paddock case interpretation is correct. Suffice
to note that in the case of Lelohn Manufacturing Co. v. Webb" it was
said that the restrictive approach of the Paddock case is necessary if the
purpose and intent of the covenant is not to be destroyed.
It would seem obvious that an opinion against the Government as vul61.
62.
63.

Ibid.
92 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Ill. 1950).
222 F.2d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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nerable as that in the Metro case should be appealed to the highest court,
if necessary, to correct such a flagrant disregard of the law. The case
involved a question of law and the Board's view was not final.' Yet present procedures are such that no one has assumed the responsibility to institute an appeal. Such a situation would seem of interest to the legislarive as well as to the executive branches of the Government. It should be
of particular interest to the Judiciary Committees and the Committee on
Government Operations. Among others, it also should interest the Committees on Appropriations since the $173,000 involved in this case presumably is but a trifle compared to the total amount involved in all the
other similar agency agreements which have remained unchallenged because of what the Board did in the Metro case.P5
If the Government is not to adopt some appeal procedures that will
give the general public at least as much protection as it now affords the
private litigant who proceeds against the Government, then it would seem
that the least that could be done would be to make a few competent individual employees of the Government responsible for following all cases
involving the Government and reporting to the Congress all instances in
which the Government's rights are not fully protected. That procedure,
although it involves a mere reading of the opinions rendered and reporting on them, would seem to offer a restraining influence on a board such
as the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
b. The Carteret Case and the Default Article
Another striking example of the need for establishing appeal procedures
to protect the Government's interest against adverse decisions of "Disputes" boards is to be found in that class of cases involving claims for
damages sustained by contractors during delays caused by the Government. For at least eighteen years prior to 1942, the Court of Claims had
imposed affirmative damages against the Government for its delays, but
in that year the Supreme Court overruled the Court of Claims,c and four
years later in another case, held that the Government cannot be held
liable unless the contract can be interpreted to imply an unqualified
warranty by the Government to perform promptly." However, the Contract Appeals Board has declared that differences between the contract
provisions in the case of United States v. Rice"5 and those in the case of
64. 41 US.C.A. § 321 (Supp. 1955).
65. Similar agency agreements could exist between the Metro agents and other con-

tractors as well as between other agents and contractors.
66. United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942).
67. United States v. Foley, 329 U.S. 64, 67 (1946).
6S. See note 66 supra.
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Carteret Work Uniforms69 were such that the Rice case was not controlling. The Board pointed out that in the Carteret contract, the Government expressly agreed to deliver Government furnished material pursuant
to a definite schedule. While the Rice case emphasized the fact that the
Government was under no obligation to have the contemplated structure
ready at a fixed time, it also showed that the Supreme Court considered
it well established that where the contract contains clauses providing for
an equitable adjustment if changes cause an increase or decrease of cost
or affect the length of time of performance, delays incident to such
changes will not subject the Government to damage beyond that involved
in the changes themselves.
But the Board held that if article 32 (a) 70 of the Carteret contract had
intended to exclude all costs of delay, it would not have specifically excluded consequential damages or loss of profit only, and that the damages
involved were natural or direct, as distinguished from consequential. On
the basis of that reasoning, the Board allowed labor and overhead expenses amounting to a total of $25,017.04.
The Government argued that since the alleged costs were of a type
very similar to some of the costs in the Rice case, which the Supreme
Court held to be consequential damages, the Board should hold the Carteret items as consequential damages. The Board referred to the Restatement 7' description of the two types of damages, but failed to show why
the Carteretdamages were not, as stated in the Restatement, or as shown
in the cited case of Otis Elevator Co. v. Standard Constr. Co., 72 those that
might reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the
breach of such contract. Nor does the Board demonstrate how the Carteret items of damage were "direct" or "general" (those that arise natur69. ASBCA No. 1015 (1952). The provision under discussion provided:
"(a) Property to be Furnished.-The Government shall furnish to the contractor for use
in connection with and under the terms of this contract the property or equipment (hereinafter referred to as 'Property') which the attached Schedule and/or the specifications state
the Government will furnish, at the time or times, if any, and at the place specified therein.
Title to the Property shall remain in the Government. The dates fixed for the contractor's
performance of this contract are based upon the expectation that the Property will be furnished to the contractor at the times stated, or if no times are stated, in sufficient time to
enable the contractor to meet such dates. In the event that any Property is not furnished to
the contractor at such time the contracting officer shall, if duly requested by the contractor,
make a determination of the delay occasioned the contractor thereby and an equitable adjustment on account of such delay under the section of this contract entitled 'Changes', provided,
however, that the Government shall not be liable to the contractor for, and no such adjustment shall include, consequential damages or loss of profit."
70. Ibid.
71. Restatement, Contracts § 330 (1932).
72. 92 F. Supp. 603 (D. Minn, 1950).
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ally, according to the usual course of things, from the breach of the
contract itself, as defined in the Restatement). Instead, the Board did
what it is prone to do in other types of cases, such as those involving
violations of the contingent fee covenant. 73 It reviewed the facts, cited
the law, and then proceeded to state a decision, without showing how the
decision was supported by the law cited. The Board merely stated that it
is difficult for it to conceive of any other costs being a more natural or
direct result of the delay in delivering Government-furnished material
than those alleged. Yet, it did not show why those damages were not
what may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, and it has persisted in following the Carteret case in its later
decisions on the subject.74
The conclusion is inescapable, from a reading of this decision, that no
contractor's attorney would accept the Board's reasoning as final if his
client had been the one against whom the Board ruled. If appropriate
appeal procedures had been in existence at the time, it is certain that no
Government attorney, sufficiently briefed as to his responsibility, would
assume the risk of leaving such a decision unchallenged. As a matter primarily involving the construction of the contract, the decision
involved a question of law which is reviewable without question. The
standard of doubt which is commonly used to determine the propriety of
pursuing an appeal is not at all difficult to fulfill. The statement of the
Carteret decision is replete with doubt, so much so that it concludes by
grasping at a rule of construction based upon doubt 73 as an apparent
attempt to show some semblance of legal logic in the decision. Since such
damages as here allowed by the Board involve matters considerably speculative in nature, it would seem reasonably possible that the Government
would be upheld on an appeal. Obviously, there is no question of authority to question the Board's decision on the matter, and the need to
question it should be equally apparent. The future costs to the Government of a well-established precedent of paying contractors for Government delays would seem too great to allow without an expression from
the highest court on the type of contract involved. Even though the
Board were to be upheld by such a court, the matter would not rest until
73. See pp. 607-09 supra.
74. C. K. Turk Corp., ASBCA Nos. 2093 and 2307 (1955); The Foster Co., ASBCA Nos.
975, 976 and 1225 (1952).
75. " ... while contracting parties may provide for a limitation on the right to recover
damages, the harshness of that result, where there is doubt as to meaning, calls for strict
construction of the language relied upon to bar recovery. '
1 ... any doubt as to meaning of a written contract provision must be re:olved against
the party who prepared the contract!' ASBCA No. 1015 at 12. The doubt in this ca3a
would seem to be in the logic of Board's reasoning rather than in the meaning of the
contract provision.
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the contract provision was thoroughly considered and approved or rejected by Congress, if the Government were served by appropriate aggressiveness in the advocacy of its position.
In Norris-Thermador Corp.76 the question was whether the Air Force
had properly terminated the contract for default and charged the contractor the excess cost of more than $400,000 which occurred in the
repurchase of the items involved. The Board held that the termination
should have been for the convenience of the Government. The effect of
that was to relieve the contractor of its liability to the Government for
the excess costs and make the Government liable to the contractor
for such expenditures as it could establish as damages caused by the
termination. The contract provided for default termination if the contractor failed to deliver within the time specified, or perform any of the
other contract provisions, or failed to make progress so as to endanger
performance of the contract. It was not to be terminated, and there was
to be no liability for any excess cost, if any failure to perform arose out
of causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence. The
contractor experienced production difficulties almost from the start, and
found itself unable to meet the contractual delivery schedule.
Instead of analyzing the case to show whether the contractor was
legally entitled to be relieved of the default termination and the resultant
excess costs, the Board seems to state the case as the contractor's attorney
might state it. Without showing its necessity in determining the real
controversy-the cause of contractor's failure to perform-the Board
devotes considerable space to praising the contractor's achievements,
apparently for the purpose of showing why the Army wanted to have the
contractor released from its Air Force contract, and devote its full production to steel cartridge cases. The Board stated that the contractor was
able'and willing to complete the Air Force contract unless released, although the facts showed that it had completely failed to meet its commitments under the contract. By referring to a few very inconclusive communications, the Board attempted to show that the Government had in
effect released the contractor from the Air Force contract before it was
terminated for default. Reference is made to a letter of January 25,
1951, from the Army, not the Air Force, stating that the request was
logical and reasonable and that immediate action would be taken to
expedite its processing. The Board then refers to a telephone conversation in which an Air Force representative is stated to have said that a
meeting would be held to determine how the Air Force contract would be
terminated, and to, a later similar conversation in which the same representative said that the contractor could expect termination for the con76.

ASBCA Nos. 989 and 1290, 6 CCF ff 61,487 (1953).
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venience of the Government. Immediately thereafter the contractor
cancelled outstanding orders for certain special equipment for the Air
Force contract. After advising the Air Force by letter of February 19,
1951, that to meet the schedule under its expected Army contract, it
would be essential to discontinue production under the Air Force contract
by larch 31, 1951, the contractor entered into the commitments with
the Army which would necessitate the use of its facilities which had been
devoted to the Air Force contract.
The Board stated that the true issue in the case was whether the contractor acted with reasonable care and prudence in the circumstances
with which it was confronted. The Board does not state how the reasonable care and prudence of the contractor is related to the real issue-not
recognized by the Board-as to whether the contractor's failure to perform arose out of causes beyond the contractor's control and without its
fault or negligence. The advancement of a fictitious issue in disregard of
the real issue, and the reference to the contractor's good reputation for
cutting through "red tape" and acting promptly upon oral requests, seems
to be an attempt to justify the contractor's precipitate actions following the
inconclusive communications received from the Government. It is plain
enough that the contractor had practically everything to gain, and little,
if anything, to lose by discontinuing work on the Air Force contract and
entering into commitments with the Army. The Army contract offered
means to cushion the contractor's loss on the Air Force contract if
eventually terminated for default and, if not so terminated, the Army
contract would be even more valuable.
Early in its opinion the Board states that the contract was not terminated, and would not have been terminated for delays since they were
considered as excusable by responsible Government officials. But the
opinion fails to show persuasively that the statements of those officials
were intended to bind, or did in fact bind the Government as a determination, under the default article of the contract. While the Board itself did
-not make such a determination expressly, it impliedly did so by treating
7
the termination under section (e) of the default article of the contract.
Certainly, its opinion contains no statement of the cause of the contractor's failures under the contract. It is crystal clear in the default
article that responsibility for the cause of the delay involved is the only
77. "(e) If, after notice of termination of this contract under the provsi ons of paragraph
(a) of this clause, it is determined that the failure to perform this contract is due to caua
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph (b) of this clause, such Notice of Default shall he deemed to have
been issued pursuant to the clause of this contract entitled 'Termination for Convenience
of the Government,' and the rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall in such event
be governed by such clause."
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issue in a case in which it is sought to transform a termination for default
into one for the convenience of the Government. That was completely
ignored by the Board.
Actually, the Board seems to give the impression that the facts of the
case warranted a determination that the Government made binding representations to the contractor that it would not terminate for default, and
that, therefore, the Board was justified in holding that the default termination should have been one for the convenience of the Government. Thus,
the case as stated by the Board seems to be one presenting a question of
a waiver, by responsible officials, of the Government's vested right to
terminate for default, rather than a definite determination by those officials that the case involved an excusable cause for the delay. The Board
side-stepped the issue of ruling on the binding effect of the waiver, if any,
and sought to justify its determination in the case by a mere reference to
section (e). The Board did not disclose the reasons assigned by the Government in requesting reconsideration and very little of the Government's
original argument. Without an examination of the briefs1 8 it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that the opinion is based upon entirely irrelevant
grounds. If appeal procedures had existed for the use of a Government
attorney obligated to pursue the case to the court of last resort, it seems
certain that the Board would have sought much more persuasive grounds
before ruling against the Government on an item of $400,000.
c. The Iso Products Case and the Measure of Damages on Default
In the case of the Iso Products Co.,"9 the appeal concerned the damages
assessed after a termination of the company's Government contract for
default. The Board held that the damages should have been computed
upon the basis of a price quoted by Western Gear Works on March 22,
1950, before any delivery was due from Iso Products, rather than on the
basis of the price quoted by Western Gear in December when the Government made its replacement purchase. The Board's opinion was based
upon its declaration and construction of the common law rule that the
amount of such damages is the difference between the contract price and
the market value of the supplies on the date of the breach. Out of a panel
of fourteen members, there were five who dissented from the opinion in
the case. It seems reasonably certain that if the Defense Department
had appropriate appeal procedures for the Government, an appeal eventually would have produced a reversal. No record has been found of any
publication of the dissenting opinions, if any actually were written. It
is true, as the Board states, that there was a breach on March 31, 1950,
78.
79.

Briefs filed with ASBCA are not available as they are in most courts.
ASBCA No. 879, 6 CCF ff 61,483 (1953).
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because Iso Products failed to deliver fifty per cent of the items as the
contract required, but the remaining fifty per cent was not due until
June 30, 1950, and it was found that in the absence of a request for
termination and with the knowledge that the contractor was continuing
efforts to perform, the contracting officer was acting within the limits of
sound discretion in continuing the life of the contract until he received
Iso Products' letter of August 19, 1950. The contracting officer terminated the contract for default under the date of August 31, 1950, and on
December 4, 1950, purchased the items, against the contractor's account,
from Western Gear Works at a unit price of $155. Under those circumstances the Board has shown no sound reason for requiring the Government to use as a basis for computing its excess costs the price of $139.50
bid by Western Gear on March 22, 1950, in response to an inquiry by Iso
Products. The common law rule, referred to by the Board, contemplates
that the purchaser shall have a reasonable time within which to make a
replacement after it becomes definitely established that default has
occurred and the right to proceed has been terminated.80 Obviously, the
purchaser cannot be expected to make a firm commitment for repurchase
until appropriate action has been taken, by termination, to relieve the
purchaser of any obligation to the defaulting contractor. In this case,
such a firm commitment could not have been made prior to September 1,
1950, and the Board did not find that the Government had consumed an
unreasonable length of time in not repurchasing until December 4, 1950,
as it did in the case of George S. Rumley6 ' involving a delay of six
months, or that the repurchase price would have been any lower if repurchase had occurred in September rather than in December 1950.
The General Accounting Office has relied upon Board of Education v.
Maryland Casualty Company, 2 which measured the damages involved
upon the basis of the difference between the defaulter's price and the price
of the subsequent letting.s3 So measured, the damages in this case would
not be confined to a price bid some months before the expiration of the
period in which the Board itself admitted the contracting officer was
exercising sound discretion in delaying termination.
d. The General Porcelain Case and Default for Convenience
In the case of the General Porcelain Enameling & Mfg. Co.181 the
Board excused the contractor's delays on the ground that it was required
tor substitute material without any prior disclosures that would have
So.
SI.
S2.
83.
84.

The Board recognizes this in the case of George S. Rumley, ASBCA No. 1009 (1953).
Ibid.
27 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1928).
23 Comp. Gen. 237 (1943); 22 Comp. Gen. 1035, 1038 (1943).
ASBCA No. 1274 (1953).
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enabled it to anticipate that possibility, and was, therefore, "caught by
unforeseeable conditions necessitating a change", in view of which the
Board held that the termination should have been for the convenience of
the Government rather than for the default of the contractor. Two of the
thirteen members of the Board, who considered the case, dissented. From
the facts as stated in the opinion, it is not difficult to determine grounds
for appeal by the Government, if appeal procedures had been available,
or to identify the errors considered by those who dissented, even though
no actual dissenting opinion was apparently written. A disgruntled employee filed with the Government a statement charging the contractor
with fraudulently shipping rejected items with those accepted, with the
result that the contractor had difficulty getting material from its suppliers
and was unable to get loans from other banks. On the basis of the charge,
the Government made rather careful inspection of the contractor's product and found that glassine wrappings were pitting the prefabricated
drum parts involved in the contract. The Government ordered such wrapping stopped until a solution could be determined, then directed resumption of work with polyethylene wrappings. The contractor claimed
difficulty in getting its employees back, and in locating the necessary
polyethylene paper for wrapping. As of January 18, 1952, the contractor
was delinquent as to 956,220 sets of drum parts and by letter of January 21, 1952, the contract was terminated for default. Later, the parties
executed a supplemental agreement amending the termination notice of
January 21st to show that 955,700 instead of 956,220 sets were terminated for default, and making a change in one part of the pertinent
contract specification so as to add the phrase "other than glassine lined
bags" after the words, "barrier material", referred to in that specification. By reason of that change, the supplement recited that the unit price
for 473,440 of the sets delivered would be increased by $.02471 per set,
or a total sum of $11,698.70. In addition to that sum, the Government
agreed, in the supplement, to pay the contractor the sum of $2,953 in
reimbursement of its cost of repackaging 8,080 sets of drum parts which
had been packed in glassine lined bags but, at the request of the Government, were repacked in polyethylene bags, and also to pay the contractor
the sum of $25,555 for 461,310 glassine lined bags located at the contractor's plant, and 1,1622 square yards of 25" glassine material owned
by the contractor but located at the Central States Paper Bag Company,
St. Louis, Missouri, rendered of no value to the contractor by reason of
the specification change.
The Government apparently argued that other paper could have been
used in place of polyethylene if the latter were unavailable. The Board
reasoned, however, that since polyethylene had met with Government
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approval, and since the use of glassine paper had proved unsatisfactory,
the contractor would reasonably be inclined to follow through with the
use of the polyethylene rather than take chances "on further unforeseen
developments." The Board declared it to be a rather unusual situation
"that neither the Government nor the contractor knew, at the time [presumably, at the time the contract was executed], the effect of glassine
wrappings," and expressed the view that there was clearly nothing about
the discovery of that effect which could in any way "be laid upon the
contractor's shoulders as a failure in its contractual responsibilities." The
fallacy of the Board's reasoning is not difficult to see when it is noted
that it fails to state just what were the contractor's responsibilities as to
making deliveries which met the specifications of the contract. It is clear
that the contractor was required to deliver drum sets that were not pitted
and that the packaging specifications for those drum sets did not expressly
refer to any particular kind of paper, such as glassine lined kraft bags.
It is also clear that irrespective of how the drum sets were packaged, the
Government's inadvertent acceptance of drum sets not conforming to the
contract specifications, over a period of time, would not at any time preclude the Government from demanding sets which did meet such specifications, without regard to the contractor's malperformance which caused
the delivery of faulty drum sets, or without regard to the stage at which
such malperformance occurred. Since that is true, the mere fact that
malperformance appears to have arisen out of the method used by the
contractor to package its product for delivery does not alter the obvious
fact that the Government cannot be held chargeable with the contractor's
failure to deliver drum sets that would meet the specifications of the contract. The situation would have been entirely different if the specifications
had required the contractor to use glassine lined bags. In that event, the
Government's acceptance of deliveries packaged with such material would
have given the contractor some ground for claiming the sums which the
Government agreed to pay under the supplemental agreement, but on the
facts as presented in the opinion there appears to be no doubt that instead
of reversing the termination for default, the Board should have upheld the
termination and pointed out the total lack of consideration issuing to the
Government under that agreement. The terms of this agreement alone
should show the importance not only of establishing definite procedures
whereby the Government may appeal from administrative opinions, but
also of a careful analytical study of all Board opinions as they are issued.
The aspect of the Government's entering into such agreements without
consideration is serious enough, but it appears doubly serious to read an
administrative opinion quoting such an agreement without observing this
fact. The weaknesses of the Board in that respect are surpassed only in
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the vulnerability of the reasoning process by which it concluded that the
default termination should have been one for the convenience of the Government. And the fact that the termination was not immediate-a situation which is very common, as the Board well knows, to give contractors
every reasonable chance to perform-was no justification for the Board's
expressed assumption that the Government recognized the delays as
excusable.
e. The Construction Service Case and the Extra Work Article
In the case of the Construction Service Company," the pertinent portion of the contract required the appellant contractor to replace certain
substandard fire hydrants at Fort Dix, New Jersey, which were to be
connected to the mains with six-inch diameter pipe. It was discovered
with respect to thirteen of the twenty-three hydrants involved, that while
the two outlets forming part of the water main were of the same size as
the main, the size of the outlet for the laterally connecting pipe was only
four inches. This made it necessary to install reducers, or to remove the
existing "T" pipes and replace them with those which had six-inch lateral
outlets, for which the appellant requested-but had been denied by the
contracting officer-an increase in the contract price. The Board held
that the decision of the contracting officer required the replacement of
substantial portions of the main itself, which was extra work as anticipated by and provided for in paragraph three of the contract.
Eight members of the Board concurred in the decision but five members
dissented, one of these writing a dissenting opinion. In the dissent the
testimony of a witness for the appellant is quoted to show that before
signing the contract, the appellant knew that some of the hydrants had
four-inch inlets and laterals, but had assumed that they were connected
at the main by a six-inch "T" with a reducer. The dissenting opinion
would appear to leave no doubt that had appeal procedures been in existence for the Government, those responsible under such procedures would
have been persuaded to appeal from the Board's disposition of the case. The
dissenting opinion pointed out that the known presence of hydrants with
four-inch inlets and four-inch laterals should have warned appellant that
there were two possibilities to be found in the "T"s: four-inch "T"s, or
six-inch "T"s with reducers; that appellant made only one assumption-the
wrong one-and that it then sought to hold the Government because the
other turned out to be the correct one. The prevailing opinion is criticized
for supporting the appellant upon the theory of a Change Order under
and pursuant to the "Changes and Extra" article, by its finding, in effect,
that to connect the new hydrants to the mains by a six-inch pipe does not
85.
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include furnishing and installing the connection. The dissenting opinion
noted that the contract provided that hydrants shall be connected to the
mains with six-inch diameter pipe, and raises a question as to how pipes
can be connected with a main, either as replacements or as new installations, without furnishing the necessary connecting material. Pertinent
parts of the contract involved, emphasizing that the responsibility for a
complete job was on the contractor, even though every detail was not
specifically covered, were quoted to show the error of the prevailing
opinion. In concluding, reference is made to the play upon the word
"main" and the confidence which the appellant displayed in arguing that
the contract did not require it to make any corrections or repairs in the
main. The dissenting opinion agrees that no repairs are required but
points out that replacing a four-inch "T" with a six-inch "T" was not
correcting the main in the sense of repairing it, but was the method of
attaching the six-inch lateral to the main, contemplated by the word "connected" in the specifications.
Yrzy
MX. Sum
It is serious enough to find administrative decisions, adverse to the
Government, involving considerable sums of money and based upon irrelevant grounds. It is shocking to learn that those decisions are made without any procedures in existence to provide the Government with an
effective means to challenge them, unfettered by "influence from on
high." 6 The need for a comprehensive study of the extent to which the
86. Among other cases where the existence of appellate advocacy for the Government
dearly should have resulted in a successful appeal against the Board's ruling are McGrath
& Co., ASBCA No. 1949 (1956), in which six members of the Board discented from
the holding that delivery of items of no value to the Navy was a matter beyond the
appellant's control and without its fault or negligence; Mario G. Mirabelli & Co., ASBCA
No. 1726 (1955), in which the contractor was held not to be in default at the time its
contract was terminated; Lincoln Industries, ASBCA No. 334, 5 CCF U 61,250 (1951), involving liquidated damages in the sum of over $55,MCJ,where the Board waived many days
of delay and found the contractor entitled to consume approximately 129 days from the
date of the contract to find and report a specification error which the Government found
was easily ascertainable; Hayward-Schuster Woolen Mills, Inc., ASBCA No. 1337, 6 CCF
ff 61,506 (1953), an appeal from the contracting officer's unilateral determination of
the contract price, under the price revision article. Two members disented from the Board's
allowance of profit of 11.93 per cent as against contractor's estimate of 6 per cent of agreed

unit costs. Dunn Constr. Co., and Polk Smartt Paving Co., ASBCA No. 1697 (1948),
where the Army Board of Contract Appeals denied the Government the right to have
reconsidered the matter of the contractor's liability for Government-furnished material, on
the ground that the evidence relied upon was not "new and influential"; and M",ifilin Body
Works, ASBCA No. 723, 5 CCF ff 61,276 (1951), where the Board found that the delays
of the Government in making payments for lumber delivered by the contractor under certain
of its contracts caused the contractor's failure to perform under eight other contracts and
that, therefore, the contractor was not liable for the exciss costs.
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Government may actually lack effective advocacy of its legal position in
all of its agencies is apparent. If, as our armed services in the past have
experienced, there be fetters or mere mismanagement, or a combination
of both, which restricts the advancement of our legal service beyond a
certain parallel line, no change in the status quo can be expected until the
public is made fully aware of the situation. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the case analysis presented in this article, one indisputable
fact remains: adequate protection of the Government's interest requires
that appeal from administrative decisions should not be a privilege of the
contractor alone.

